The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 66 | Number 2

May 1999

Early Induction of Labor: Legal and Ethical
Considerations
Karin Clark,
Anthony Fisher,
John Keown
Warwick Neville,

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Clark,, Karin; Fisher,, Anthony; Keown, John; and Neville,, Warwick (1999) "Early Induction of Labor: Legal and Ethical
Considerations," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 66: No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol66/iss2/2

Article 2
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This paper addresses legal and ethical issues concerning the early
induction l of labor in relation to children in utero who are said to be
diagnosed as having "lethal abnormalities." It has its genesis in differing
medical advice being given to Catholic hospitals in Australia following the
diagnosis of children in utero as having certain kinds of disabilities.
Although our remarks are directed to and arise in, an Australian context,
the principles involved have wider application.
We are aware that, in the absence of authoritative and binding
teaching by the Magisterium in relation to certain bioethical issues, there is
scope for differing perspectives to be advanced within Catholic theological
circles as to what is licit or morally permissible.2 We are concerned,
however, that on occasion, a position which is advanced as morally
permissible may have two consequences: first, while held in good
conscience as morally licit, it may nonetheless expose those involved in it
to potential criminal or civil liability.) Secondly, what might be presented
4
as, theoretically, morally licit conduct may have unforeseen psychological
and spiritual 5 consequences sufficient to counsel caution or to make the
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choice immoral.
We presuppose the basic proposition of Catholic teaching that, in
the absence of a diagnosis requiring surgical correction of an anomaly, the
induction of labor simply because a child suffers some defect is a direct
abortion and, therefore, a grave offense. 6 In particular, we note the
following statements from the 1995 encyclical letter, The Gospel of Life
(Evangelium Vitae):
The deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being

(innocuum hominem) of his life is always morally evil
(semper morali iudicio malum est) and can never be licit
either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end. (n.57)
... Procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by
whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the
initial phase of his or her existence, extending from
conception to birth. (n.58) [emphasis in text]
It is true that the decision to have an abortion is often tragic
and painful for the mother, insofar as the decision to rid
herself of the fruit of conception is not made for purely
selfish reasons or out of convenience, but out of a desire to
protect certain important values such as her own health or a
decent standard of living for the other members of the family.
Sometimes it is feared that the child to be born would live in
such conditions that it would be better if the birth did not
take place. Nevertheless, these reason s and others like them,
however serious and tragic, can never justify the deliberate
killing of an innocent human being. (n. 58) [emphasis in text]

Therefore, by the authority which Christ conferred upon
Peter and his Successors, in communion with the Bishops ... !

declare that direct abortion, thaI is abortion willed as an end
or as a means, (sive uli jinem inlentum seu III instrumetnum)
always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the
deliberate killing of an innocent human being (innocentis
hominis).
No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can
ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit (natura
illicitum), since it is contrary to the law of God which is
written in every human heart knowable -by reason itself, and
proclaimed by the Church. (n .62) [emphasis in textf

This holds true " no matter the age or condition of that person."g Further,
this Memorandum eschews the suggestion found in some literature that
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pregnancy is a pathological condition inimical to a woman's well-being or
an artificial condition akin to artificial life support.
It is as well, at the outset, to state that, subject to a definitive
statement from the Magisterium on the question, for the reasons listed
hereunder, we consider that the early induction of labor in relation to a
child in utero, diagnosed with a terminal condition which is nonthreatening
to the life or health of his or her mother, for the reason only that the child
has a terminal condition, is always morally illicit. 9
On a strict
interpretation of the law in Australia, such an induction may also be illegal.
At the outset, some comment must be made on the terminology
commonly employed in this discussion . First, the terminology of "futility"
has been applied traditionally to treatment administered to persons, not to
the persons themselves or their lives. Secondly, although not uncommon in
medical parlance, the adjective " lethal" has usually been applied to
inanimate objects, such as " weapons", or to force or actions, not to people
or to children in utero. Traditionally persons are diagnosed with "terminal"
conditions, not "lethal" ones. Thirdly, the use of such loaded terminology
in the present discussion only prejudices the argument in favor of the
conclusion that the child, whose life is dismissed as "futile", whose
condition is tagged as "lethal" and a "threat" to the mother, should be
eliminated.
Such misleading language should be avoided in this
discussion. lo
This Memorandum considers the following matters relevant to the
formal issue of early induction: status of the unborn child, duties to the
mother, duties to the child in utero, the question of futility , and fetal
sentience.

Status of the Unborn Child
The public policy of every jurisdiction in Australia, and generally
in the Anglo-Australian common law world, is designed to protect the life
of the unborn child. 11 That same public policy is reflected in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959) and in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).12 The primary test
articulated in this Convention is stated in the following terms: " . .. the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration" (Article 3.1). That
same test is applied, even without reference to the Convention, in courts
Applying that test to the present
throughout the Commonwealth.1.I
discussion, the question, framed rhetorically, becomes " How is it in the
best interests of a child with a disability in utero to be 'better off dead,?,,14
In each Australian state and territory, laws prohibit or severely
restrict both a mother and a third party inducing an abortion. The letter of
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the law, while restrictive, has not always respected fully the personhood of
the unborn child; nor has the practice of the law in relation to abortion
always been to apply the express provisions of the criminal statutes which
prohibit abortion. As was stated in the submission to the High Court of
Australia on behalf of the Australian Catholic Health Care Association and
the Australian Catholic Bishops' Conference in proceedings involving a
claim for damages for "wrongful birth" (September, 1996):
In the common law world, there is a complex mass of
decisions relating to unborn children. These decisions are
often difficult to reconcile. Their incoherence derives from
the obvious fact that the unborn child is an individual
organism of the human species and the objective, in certain
respects, is to ensure that it does not have the rights of other
human beings. The common law has not treated the unborn
child as a legal person for all purposes .... Modem knowledge
entitles and strongly suggests that the Courts recognise, at
least for the purposes of the most basic protection, that the
unborn fully share the one thing in common in reality : being
living individuals of the human species. 15

The submission referred to lists a plethora of authorities from
many jurisdictions which recognize duties of care owed to the unborn child
and rights exercisable by him or her at or after birth. An extract of that
submission is attached (see Appendix A). To them should be added the
recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW) in Reg. v F16 in
which an unborn child was held to be a person for the purposes of
determining whether a driver who caused her death could be charged with
and convicted of culpable driving. Further cases and argument concerning
the status of the child in utero, the duty owed to him or her, and the duties
owed to his or her mother, are set out in the extensive study sponsored by
the Australian Medical Association, the Medical Protection Association of
Australia, the Royal Australian College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists, the National Association of Specialist Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists and the Australian College of Paediatrics prepared by John
Seymour of the Australian National University Faculty of Law and a team
of specialist medical and legal authors, Fetal Welfare and the Law. That
report states, in relation to " highly invasive fetal therapy":
In assessing a pregnant woman for fetal surgery .. .. the
diagnosis of fetal compromise must be reliable, the natural
history of the fetal condition in the absence of surgical
intervention must predict a poor fetal outcome and, most
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importantly the risks of the surgical procedure to the
pregnant woman must be low. I?
Although concerned fonnally with fetal therapy, these principles apply
generally to the ultimate "therapy" of induction. For the purposes of the
present discussion, we simply note the report's emphasis upon the primacy
of reliable diagnosis, and that the interests of the child in utero and the
mother must be assessed appropriately.

Duty of Care to Mothers and Children In Utero
Two points may be made. First, the law does not, in general,
impose a duty to provide medical treatment which is not medically
indicated. Assuming that the child' s condition is fatal for the child but
untreatable, and that child 's condition poses no threat to the life or health
of his or her mother, any "treatment" would not be medically indicated for
either child or mother and there is no duty to treat either. 18 Secondly, in the
provision of medical treatment to the mother the law requires, inter alia,
that she be advised of the range of physical and psychological
consequences which would likely flow from the early induction of labor in
relation to a child in utero in circumstances where, although the condition
diagnosed in relation to the child is likely to be tenninal for that child, that
19
condition poses no threat to the life or health of the mother.
Further, in the event that the diagnosis in relation to the child in
utero was incorrect and an induction was performed, the likely severe
psychological and other distress suffered by the mother (and father) could
very likely result in those who had counseled or participated in such a
course of conduct being sued in negligence. Liability would probably
extend beyond the medical practitioners who perfonned the procedure to
others who had contributed to the decision-making process. In addition, or
in the alternative, to claims in tort, claims could be made for breach of
contract between the patient(s) and the medical practitioner pursuant to
which the practitioner (and the health care facility) agreed to provide
certain services, which have not been so provided .2o Further, whether or
not the diagnosis of a tenninal condition is accurate, those involved in
inducing early labor for this reason may commit the offense of abortion
and, if the child is born alive and then dies, the offenses of, inter alia,
murder, manslaughter, or child destruction .21
The concept of futility being applied to a pregnancy in which a
child is said to be diagnosed with one or more " lethal abnonnalities", is
inapt for another reason. If a claim was to be brought by the mother and/or
the surviving child,22 and/or the deceased child 's legal representatives

May, 1999

11

against the treating doctors, health care staff, advisors and the relevant
Catholic institution, a possible first line of inquiry would be to consider
authoritative statements from within the Catholic community in relation to
appropriate medical practice concerning so-called "lethal abnormalities."
One such document, already referred to, is the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops of the United States Committee on Doctrine statement,
"Moral Principles Concerning Infants with Anencephaly,,23 ("the NCCB
statement"). Those principles make plain that "the rights of a mother and
her unborn child deserve equal protection because they are based on the
dignity of the human person whatever the condition of that person."
In any litigation, a "best practice" standard in negligence and the
terms implied in the contract between the health care provider and the
mother and child could be measured against Church documents such as the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Evangelium Vitae, Charter for Health
Care Workers, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services (infra), and the NCCB statement, not only in relation to
anencephaly but also in relation to any other " lethal abnormalities." To the
degree that any procedure resulting in the early induction of labor breached
the principles set out in these documents, it could well contribute to a
finding of negligence, or breach of contract, against those who carried out
or advised such a procedure.

Ethical Considerations24
The parameters for this discussion were set in 1974 by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in the Declaration on Procured
Abortion (Questio de abortu) and reaffirmed in 1995 by John Paul II in
Evangelium Vitae. It is as well to recall the following from that encyclical:
Prenatal diagnosis, which presents no moral objections if
carried out in order to identifY the medical treatment which
may be needed by the child in the womb, all too often
becomes an opportunity for proposing and procuring an
abortion. This is eugenic abortion, justified in public opinion
on the basis of a mentality - mistakenly held to be consistent
with the demands of "therapeutic interventions" - which
accepts life only under certain conditions and rejects it when
it is affected by any limitation, handicap or illness.
On a more general level , there exists in contemporary culture
a certain Promethian attitude which leads people to think that
they can control life and death by taking the decisions about
them into their own hands. What really happens in this case
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is that the individual is overcome and crushed by a death
deprived of any prospect of meaning or hope. We see a
tragic expression of all this in the spread of euthanasia disguised or surreptitious, or practiced openly and even
legally. As well as for reasons of a misguided pity at the
sight of a patient's suffering, euthanasia is sometimes
justified by the utilitarian motive of avoiding costs which
bring no return and which weigh heavily on society. Thus it
is proposed to eliminate malformed babies, the severely
handicapped, the disabled, the elderly, especially when they
are not self-sufficient, and the terminally il1. 25

Against this background, if it be the case that no medical or
surgical treatment is indicated which would cure the genetic or physical
anomaly diagnosed in relation to the child, and given that that anomaly
poses no threat to the life or health of the mother, and given that mothers
are not incubators or artificial life support systems, and given that
pregnancy is normal, and that healthy unborn children (even sick ones) are
ordinarily in utero, one is hard-pressed to see that continuation of the
pregnancy can be categorized as "futile". For the same reason, it is bizarre
to suggest that there is some moral equivalence between the withdrawal of
extraordinary treatment in relation to a terminal illness and the continuation
of a pregnancy in relation to which the child in utero has been diagnosed as
having a terminal condition when that abnormality poses no threat to the
life or well-being of the mother. 26
Further, if there is nothing wrong with depriving a terminally ill
unborn child of basic necessities of life, there is nothing wrong with doing
likewise with an identically affected newborn. For what is the difference
between taking the unborn child from the safe environment of his or her
mother's womb and exposing the child to the world, and taking an
identically affected newborn from his or her incubator or special care unit
and exposing the child in the hospital grounds? Morally and legally, the
intention is to kill the child; equally so in relation to the non-medically
indicated induction of a child with, say, anencephaly, at 16, 18 or 22
weeks ' gestation. In such cases, the induction will kill the child (by
whatever means - dilation and evacuation or the effects of prostaglandin[s]), and it will be the intention that it do so, whereas the induction of
labor of such a child at term will not necessarily do SO. 27
The suggestion that continuing a pregnancy in case of diagnoses of
children with terminal conditions and comparing it or relating it to the
withdrawal of extraordinary treatment warrants another comment. As is
well known, treatment need not be provided to a person who is terminally
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ill where to do so is either futile or unduly burdensome. In this connection,
the remarks of the NCCB Committee for Pro-Life Activities are apposite:
Financial and emotional burdens are willingly endured by
most families to raise their children or to care for mentally
aware but weak and elderly family members. It is sometimes
argued that we need not endure comparable burdens to feed
and care for persons with severe mental and physical
disabilities, because their "quality of life" makes it
unnecessary or pointless to preserve their lives.
But this argument - even when it seems motivated by humanitarian concern to reduce suffering and hardship - ignores the
equal dignity and sanctity of all human life .
.... It is one thing to withhold a procedure because it would
impose new disabilities on a patient, and quite another thing
to say that patients who already have such disabilities should
not have their lives preserved. A means considered ordinary
or proportionate for other patients should not be considered
extraordinary or disproportionate for severely impaired
patients solely because of a judgment that their lives are not
worth living.28

The point to be made here is that if the analogy with extraordinary
treatment has any merit at all, presumably it would have to be shown that
the continuation of the pregnancy is either futile or unduly burdensome to
the child or to the mother. It is especially inapt so to describe a pregnancy.
It would lead to mothers describing themselves as being "futilely
pregnant. ,,29
Dr. Peter Cataldo, of the Pope John Center, commenting on the
NCCB statement, observes, inter alia :
It can also be concluded from the NCCB statement that the
mother' s womb cannot be regarded as a useless life support
system that may be terminated because in general there is no
moral obligation to provide useless treatment. Given the
inestimable human dignity of the anencephalic child, the
uterine environment in which he or she lives is not useless
since it is supporting nothing other than a fully human
individual. 30

Cataldo comments further, in the light of the Ethical and Religious
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Directives for Catholic Health Care Services issued by the U.S. Bishops,31
and the NCCB statement, that the psychological state of the mother does
not qualify as a proportionate reason for terminating the life of the infant
by inducing labor either before or after viability. He states:
The emotional trauma of the mother is a response to the
condition of anencephaly, but the statement [of the NCCB]
shows that the act in terminating a pregnancy is in itself
directed at the infant not the mother: "Anencephaly is not a
pathology of the mother, but of the child, and terminating
her pregnancy cannot be a treatment of a pathology she
does not have.,,32

Jarvis states the obvious:
The possible psychological effect arising from screening
should also be borne in mind. Patients need to be
adequately counseled before they enter a screening
programme, whilst patients may need significant
reassurance should investigations ultimately prove to be
negative, whilst other patients may suffer adverse
psychological effects related to late termination of
pregnancy.33 (emphasis added)

More expansively, in the light of a significant body of medical literature,
Dr. McCullagh discusses the issue of "unresolved grieving." One citation
from that discussion may suffice to indicate the inappropriateness of early
induction on the basis that a woman is better off without carrying to term a
child diagnosed with a fetal anomaly:
It was once thought that a woman would rapidly "get over"
a stillbirth or a neonatal death, because she had not
"known" the baby or known it for very long. Nothing, of
course, could be further from the truth, as every woman
34
who has experienced such a loss would well recognize .

Induction of labor in relation to a child in utero diagnosed with a
fetal anomaly which is non-life threatening to the health or welfare of the
mother also raises the specter of fetal sentience and the pain and suffering
imposed upon the child in utero in the course of induction. 35 The physical
pain inflicted upon a child in utero must be a consideration in the
determination of appropriate treatment. 36
A final consequence of holding as licit early induction of labor in
relation to a child in utero when his or her terminal condition poses no
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threat to the life or well-being of his or her mother is that it immediately
admits an exception to the prohibition against the intentional taking of
innocent human life. As such it would establish a precedent for exceptions
to the prohibition set out in paragraph 3 (supra) from Evangelium Vitae.
As noted earlier, we are of the view that the early induction of labor
concerning a child in utero, diagnosed with a terminal condition which is
non-threatening to the life or health of his or her mother, is not morally licit
and in common law jurisdictions such as Australia may be illegal.
Historically, of course, there are many examples where courts have
sanctioned ever-expanding exceptions to basic principles, such as the
prohibition against intentional killing or the inviolability of every person.
One example will suffice. In the infamous case of Buck v Bell, the United
States Supreme Court, in the course of authorizing the forced sterilization
of mentally disabled persons said:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt
to be such by those concerned, in order to avoid our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world,
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind.37

As bizarre as these remarks are, an echo of them was still heard in 1976. In
considering competing claims by the State and the individual in relation to
reproductive rights, it was held that mental retardation was an identifiable
category or type and that persons so diagnosed are in fact different from the
general population. They may rationally be accorded different treatment
for their benefit and the benefit of the pUblic. 38 Sheila McLean comments
on this case saying that the "compulsory prevention of the birth of a
defective child or of a child whose parents could not properly care for it
could be justified as reflecting a compelling state interest and therefore as
not breaching the Fourteenth Amendment to the [U .S.] Constitution.,,39
It seems to us that an argument which proposes that a child,
diagnosed in utero with a terminal condition which is not threatening to the
life or health of his or her mother, should suffer certain death from early
induction, is of a kind which could open the way for a slide in criteria from
induction of labor concerning children with a terminal condition to the
induction of labor for children with any kind of disability. Further, to grant
such an exception allows for a slide from induction (for any reason) to

16

Linacre Quarterly

destructive abortion. The possibility for such "developments" should never
be countenanced.

Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, we are of the view that the early
induction of labor in relation to a child diagnosed with a terminal
condition, for the reason only that the child has a terminal condition, is not
40
morally licit.
It may also expose those who counsel and perform it to
criminal and civilliability.41

Appendix A
Sample Legal Authorities on the Status of the Unborn Child.
There is a growing body of law which recognize duties of care owed to the
unborn child and rights exercisable by it at or after birth. See Watt v. Rama
[1972] VR 353; X and Y v. PAL (1991) 23 NSWLR 26; Lynch v. Lynch
(1991) 25 NSWLR 411; Burton v. Islington Health Authority [1993] QB
204, (1992) 3 All ER 833.
Moreover, it has been held that murder or manslaughter can be
committed where unlawful injury is deliberately inflicted either to a child
in utero or to a mother carrying a child in utero in certain circumstances.
Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 WLR 412 at 426427, 2 All ER 10 at 22 (CA); see also R. v. Martin (Supreme Court of
Western Australia, Owen J, 8 December, 1995, unreported); R. v. Rinley
(Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal , 4 April, 1996, unreported);
R. v. Lippiatt (District Court of Queensland, Judge Hoath, 24 May, 1996,
unreported). See also the judgment of Slicer J in Re K. ex parte The Public
Trustee of Tasmania (Supreme Court of Tasmania, [1996] 5 Tas R 365)
which contains many references to various decisions and statutory
provisions which deal with the status (in various contexts) of the unborn
child . These decisions are not coherent with each other.
The same incoherence is reflected in those cases in which the
standing of third parties to protect the interests of the unborn child is in
issue. For example, see At/orney-General (Qld) (Ex rei Kerr) v. T (1983)
46 ALR 275 ; In the Marriage of F and F (1989) FLC 92-031 ; Paton v.
Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Services [1979] QB 276 (1978) 2
All ER987; Tremblay v. Daigle (1989) 62 DLR (4th) 634 ( a father has no
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standing to restrain the abortion of his unborn child); Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976) 428 US 52; Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Penmylvania v. Casey (1992) US 120 L Ed 2d 674, (1992)
112 S Ct 2791 (a father is not to be notified of the intended abortion of his
unborn child); C v. S [1988] QB 135, (1987) I All ER 1230 (when is a
child "capable of being born alive")' Re F In Utero [1988] Fam 122, (1988)
2 All ER 193 ( a court has no jurisdiction to make an unborn child a ward);
In re S (adult refusal of medical treatment) [1993] Fam 123, (1992) 4 All
ER 671 (a health authority is entitled to apply for declaratory relief to
override the refusal of a mother to consent to an operation to avert medical
risk to herself and her child in utero); Rance v. Mid-Downs Health
Authority [1991] I QB 587 (parents not entitled to abort a child capable of
being born alive nor are they entitled to recover the cost of raising and
caring for a child born with spina bifida); R v. Tait [1989] 3 All ER 682 (a
threat to a mother to kill her child in utero by bringing about a miscarriage
does not constitute the offense of making a threat to kill); Whitner v. State
of South Carolina (no. 24468: Supreme Court of South Carolina, IS July,
1996) (a mother who ingested crack cocaine during her pregnancy, and
whose child was born with cocaine metabolites in the child's system,
pleaded guilty to criminal child neglect); Wall v. Livingstone [1982]
I NZLR 734 (a doctor is not entitled to challenge the opinion of other
medical practitioners to abort a child in utero).
Cj Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (Preamble: " ... the
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well
as after birth"; Article 6 "I. States Parties recognize that every child has the
inherent right to life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child" ); and generally see
Nancy Rhoden "The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late
Abortions" (1984) 72 Georgetown Law Journal 1451-1509.
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more

particularly

of prenatal
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May, 1999

25

